
How Employees Should Verify an IT Support Request
Summary: Attackers are impersonating IT support in Microsoft Teams and gaining remote access within minutes. This article shows SMB leaders how to give employees one clear, consistent way to verify a support request, especially when internal IT and an outside provider share the work.
It starts with your inbox. Hundreds of newsletter confirmations and subscription emails land in a few minutes, burying anything useful. While you’re still staring at the mess, a Microsoft Teams message pops up. It’s from “IT Service Desk (Matthew).” He’s seen the spam problem, he can fix it, and he just needs you to open Quick Assist and read him a six-digit code.
It feels like help. It’s actually the opening move of an attack.
On October 26, Arctic Wolf Labs published research on more than 400 incidents in which attackers used Microsoft Teams external chat to impersonate IT support and talk employees into granting remote access. In the successful cases customers reported, attackers went from first engagement to running malicious code in under 15 minutes. That’s less time than it takes most people to find their IT team’s phone number.
The lesson for Canadian SMBs isn’t “tell staff to be more careful.” It’s that employees can only verify an IT support request if they know exactly what a real one looks like. And if your support comes from both an internal team and an outside provider, that picture is probably blurrier than you think.
Why this scam works so well
Most employees have learned to be wary of email. Teams feels different. It’s where colleagues chat all day, so a message there carries borrowed trust. And Teams allows external access by default, which means anyone with a Microsoft 365 tenant can message your staff.
Attackers take full advantage. They set up tenants with names like “helpdeskteam365,” add “(Internal)” to their display name to undercut the External label Teams shows, and use friendly first names so they sound like someone from your service desk. Many follow up with a voice call, the same vishing playbook that’s been spreading across phones and messaging apps.
Nothing is being hacked here. No vulnerability is exploited. The attacker simply asks, under pressure, at the exact moment the employee wants the problem gone. Quick Assist, AnyDesk or another remote tool does the rest. If this sounds familiar, it’s because ransomware groups have been abusing Microsoft Teams this way for a couple of years. What’s changed is the volume and the polish.
That’s why this is a process problem as much as a training problem. Human error is predictable. The goal is a process that holds up when someone is flustered.
Step 1: Document how real IT makes contact
Ask a simple question at your next leadership meeting: how does our IT support actually reach employees? If the answer is “it depends,” that’s the gap.
Write it down in plain language. Which channels does support use? Does a technician ever start a conversation in Teams, or only respond to tickets? Will every legitimate request reference a ticket number? Which domains do messages come from, and who are the named contacts?
In a co-managed IT arrangement, this matters twice over. Employees may hear from your in-house IT lead one day and your provider’s help desk the next. If the two teams operate differently, staff have no baseline to compare against, and “I’m new at your IT provider” becomes the perfect cover story. Agree on one standard across both teams and publish it somewhere employees can find in thirty seconds.
Step 2: Verify before anyone gets remote access
Here’s the rule that does the heavy lifting: no one gets control of your screen until you’ve confirmed the request through a channel you already trust.
That means calling the support number listed on your intranet or ticket portal, not the number the “technician” offers. It means checking that the ticket they mention actually exists. An impersonator who controls the Teams chat can’t fake a verification that lives somewhere else.
An impersonator who controls the chat can’t fake a verification that lives somewhere else.
Make the rule unconditional. Real technicians won’t be offended by a callback; good ones will be relieved. And give employees explicit permission to hang up, even on someone who sounds senior and annoyed. Urgency is the attacker’s main tool, so slowing down is the employee’s best defence.
Step 3: Review who can message your staff in Teams
Most SMBs don’t need every organization on earth to be able to start a chat with their employees. Yet that’s the default setting.
Look at who you genuinely collaborate with through Teams: key clients, vendors, your IT provider. Then move from “allow all external domains” to an allow-list of those partners. Block chats from unmanaged personal accounts and from trial tenants, which attackers favour because they take minutes to set up. These settings sit alongside the other Microsoft 365 security controls many businesses never revisit after setup.
Step 4: Lock down remote-support tools
Attackers love remote tools because they’re legitimate. Quick Assist is built into Windows and signed by Microsoft. AnyDesk, TeamViewer and ScreenConnect are everyday software that rarely raise eyebrows.
Decide which remote tool your support teams actually use, and restrict or remove the rest. Limit Quick Assist to authorized IT roles, or disable it if no one relies on it. Then treat any unexpected installation as something to investigate, not ignore. Your remote access policy should spell out which tools are approved and who can use them.
Step 5: Rehearse the scenario
Policies on paper don’t help much at 4:45 on a Friday when someone’s inbox is exploding. Practice does.
Run a short exercise: flood a test inbox, then have someone reach out pretending to be the help desk. Watch what happens. Does the employee know the callback number? Do they know who to report it to? Does your internal team know the provider is aware, and vice versa?
Fold the scenario into your existing security awareness training so it feels like a skill, not a trap. Showing employees a real support message and a fake one side by side makes the External tag far easier to notice the next time it counts.
One process, every support team
The core idea is simple. Employees can’t spot a fake technician if they don’t know how the real ones operate. Give them a clear, consistent standard, a verification step that lives outside the chat, and fewer open doors in Teams and your remote tooling.
At Gibraltar Solutions, we work alongside internal IT teams across the GTA to build exactly this kind of shared process, from Teams external access settings to help desk verification standards and employee training. If you’re not sure how your team would handle a convincing “help desk” call tomorrow, let’s find out together before an attacker does.
Key Takeaways:
- Arctic Wolf found more than 400 incidents where attackers used Teams external chat to pose as IT support, reaching payload execution in under 15 minutes once a victim engaged.
- Employees can only spot a fake support request if they know exactly how your real IT team makes contact, including channels, ticket numbers and named contacts.
- No one should get remote access until the request is confirmed through a known support number or trusted ticket portal, never through details the caller provides.
- Moving Teams from “allow all external domains” to a partner allow-list closes the door most of these attacks walk through.
- Rehearsing an inbox flood followed by an urgent “help desk” call tests whether internal IT, your provider and employees all follow the same playbook.
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